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KNOW YOUR ENEMY: THE CONCEPT OF FULŪL
IN THE DISCOURSE OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION[1]

1. Introduction

From the onset of the Egyptian revolution of January 25, 2011 a single strand of discourse reflecting the rapidly changing political scene has emerged and prevailed in the local media through the entire period of political turmoil up until now. This discourse is built around a set of key concepts such as, ṮUWĀR (REVOLUTIONARIES), ŠABĀB (YOUTH) featuring as the vanguard of the revolution, IRĀDA(t) AŠ-ŠAʻB (PEOPLE's WILL) – as its driving force, reason and justification, and, notably, the subject of the present study – FULŪL – enemies of the REVOLUTIONARIES associated with the Ancien Régime. Participants of this discourse regardless of their specific political affiliation have all accepted these concepts as terms of reference in public debate, while arguing for their respective views and statuses, however different those may be, and reshaping their identities in the context of an emerging new social order. These concepts all fit into or make up a mega-frame of the REVOLUTION, just as characters, settings, scenes and plot elements would combine into a movie. Not any revolution but a very specific one, whose key events happened at sites and settings that are known to all, protagonists could be often named or classified based on a set of social markers (the youth, the military, the Muslim Brotherhood members, the pillars and clients of the Ancien Régime, etc.) and key themes are still debated evoking vivid emotions and hot argument. Unlike a movie, however, this show is still going on, events keep adding up, and there is neither a single privileged view point nor a single 'true' story, the villains are villains and heroes are heroes only in as much as one party in the debate could manage to lead the discussion controlling the key sites of discursive deliberation such as media.

At its inception, the story's key protagonists were the broadly defined PEOPLE (ŠAʻB) against the narrowly defined REGIME (NIẒĀM), as reflected in the most popular revolutionary slogan *aš-šaʻb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām* (people want the downfall of the regime)[2], with JAYŠ (the Egyptian Armed Forces) featuring on the backdrop as a politically neutral patriotic force. Upon the collapse of the Ancien Régime the military effectively took power renouncing their ostensible neutrality, which prompted some revolutionaries to rephrase their slogan as *yasquṭ yasquṭ ḥukm al-ʻaskar* (let the rule of the military fall). The military were then succeeded by a democratically elected president, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood Muhammad Mursi. That led to the Muslim Brotherhood laying claim to the legacy of the revolution and the bearded traditionally dressed Muslim types featuring increasingly as the prototypical *revolutionaries* and sidelining in that capacity the young secular (often leftist) activists, who took credit for their role in triggering the initial large-scale anti-Mubarak protests. Before the ousting of President Mursi on July 3, 2013, the word *revolution* had only one referent in the media discussion – the revolution of January 25, described by media and politicians as *ṯawrat al-karāma* (the revolution of dignity), reflecting a strong moral dimension in the newly revisited concept of REVOLUTION[3]. Later, there were already two such events, as the participants of anti-Mursi protests started referring to their rallies that led to the overthrow of

President Mursi by the Egyptian military, as another *revolution*, while the Muslim Brotherhood-led National Alliance to Support Legitimacy called it a *coup*. The REVOLUTION and the status of a (true) REVOLUTIONARY have obviously come to be associated with high moral authority and even political power, thus making it an asset worth contesting for. This has contributed to a strongly polemical nature of the discourse, which affected the semantic structure of concepts from the 'traditional' political discourse inventory and stimulated the invention of new nominations and concepts with a stronger illocutionary force and more specific range of reference.

Our overall methodological approach in this study is grounded in George Lakoff's theory of conceptual metaphor[4]. For a finer analysis of the semantic contexts featuring the concept of FULŪL, we use elements of Charles J. Fillmore's frame semantics, particularly, some specific frame descriptions available on the FrameNet[5]. The FrameNet frames have been identified and described on the basis of English language material, yet the situations these frames refer to appear to be so basic that their respective descriptions seem to be almost universally applicable. At least, the very idea that semantic structures of Arabic could be presented and analyzed as frames in the same manner as it is done on the FrameNet, if even these frames may differ, appears to present no difficulties. We, however, use the FrameNet descriptions with a certain degree of caution, as a kind of guidance but also as a comparative case rather than a ready-made model, as differences and inconsistencies between our material and the FrameNet descriptions may be accounted for by a mix of different factors, such as the presumable shortcomings of the FrameNet or idiosyncrasies of either the Arabic language/culture or the Egyptian revolutionary discourse itself. It is the idiosyncratic part of the frame-sematic structures that we are primarily concerned with in this study. Leonard Talmy's force dynamics[6] is another theoretical framework that we found particularly useful for the analysis of modal aspects of acts that the revolutionaries ascribe to their opponents – FULŪL. As the material for this study we use a collection of recent Egyptian media texts available on the web which has been pre-selected on the basis of their relevance to the subject of the recent Egyptian revolution[7].

While the discourse of the Egyptian revolution may be presented as hinging on a complex dynamic semantic structure that we have tentatively described as the mega-frame of the REVOLUTION, where concepts such as FULŪL fill in specific slots, at the core of it must be some very basic frame, such as the Revolution frame as presented on the FrameNet[8]. For a more adequate representation of our Egyptian media material, however, the Revolution frame appears to be insufficient, an extension or supplement in the form of at least one more frame appears to be required – the one described as Hostile_encounter on the Framenet[9]. For the purposes of this study we will refer to the combination of at least two frames as presented on the Framenet (Revolution and Hostile_encounter) as an (extended) REVOLUTION frame. In the discourse of the recent Egyptian revolution(s), the extended REVOLUTION frame provides a backdrop or a basis for arguing both for and against specific political groups, ideas and practices by foregrounding different elements of the frame and assigning different values to these elements[10]. It is in this context that the concept of FULŪL, a key discursive tool in (post)revolutionary polemics, has emerged.

In the discourse of the Egyptian revolution the word *fulūl* (pl. of *fallᵘⁿ – break, or notch, in the edge of a sword, or of anything*)[11] has rapidly gained enormous popularity and become the key instrument of othering political opponents, initially used mainly in reference to the government officials and clients of the Ancien Régime, but later expanding its meaning and the range of reference beyond this rather narrow scope.

In our previous article[12] we focused on the role of the proverb *lā yafullu al-ḥadīd illā al-ḥadīd* (only iron notches the iron) in the semantic evolution of FULŪL. While, the salience of the proverb in the early revolutionary discourse must have contributed to making the word *fulūl* a preferred nomination in reference to the political opponents of the

revolution(s), it is important to point out that before it became an essential part of the current political vocabulary, the word had been used in one strictly defined meaning linked to a very specific scenario representing an entailment of the same metaphor underlying the proverb. In modern standard Arabic the word *fulūl* has featured mainly if not exclusively in reference to *debris of a defeated army*, cf.:

> fa-taḥawwalat ʿalā aydīhim fulūl al-jayš al-miṣrī al-maksūra al-ġayr qādira ʿalā ḥaml silāḥihim min al-ḫawf ilā usūd jāʾiʿa ilā naṣr wa šahāda[13]
>
> … and in their hands (i.e. under their command) the *debris of the defeated* (lit. broken) Egyptian army not capable of carrying their weapons out of fear have transformed into lions hungry for victory and martyrdom.

This usage fully corresponds to the meaning of *fulūl* as given in the classical Arabic dictionaries. The late 13th century Lisān al-ʿArab, for instance, gives the meaning 'defeat' for the verb *falla* and the 'defeated people' for *fall* (sing.) and *fulūl* (pl.), while citing 'breaking' and 'notching of the sword' as the original meaning (*aṣl*) of the root[14].

Given the context, from which *fulūl* was borrowed into the discourse of the Egyptian revolution, it is clear that the modern concept FULŪL is an instance of the Lakoffian POLITICS is WAR conceptual metaphor meant to represent political opponents of the REVOLUTION as a *defeated enemy*.

To be sure, there are other competitive nominations also used in reference to remnants of the Ancien Régime – such as *baqāyā* (*pl.* remainder, remnant, residue), *ḏulūl an-niẓām as-sābiq* (tails of the Ancien Régime), *abnāʾ an-niẓām as-sābiq* (sons of the Ancien Régime) and *rumūz an-niẓām as-sābiq* (symbols of the Ancien Régime). The latter two terms are devoid of any negative connotation, while *rumūz an-niẓām* is simply a standard Arabic expression referring to the most important political figures and public officials. It is only the first and the second nominations in the list that are linked to the actual scenario of the REVOLUTION – i.e. the withdrawal of their respective referents from the position of prominence and it is only the second term that assigns an evaluative (pejorative) connotation to this act. Both terms provide no clue in their semantic structures (the frames that they evoke) as regards the manner, in which their referents have been removed from the political scene in contrast to *fulūl*, which portrays them as those, who *have been defeated in a battle*. Unlike the other nominations, *fulūl* has provided a basis for derivation – cf. a totally new coinage *fulūlī*, which functions as a relative adjective or sometimes as a singular form of *fulūl*[15]. Nomination *fulūl* not only occurs far more frequently compared to other coreferential terms in the verbal discourse of the Egyptian revolution, but graphic representations in print media and on political posters of the enemies of revolution, which we discuss in another paper in this series[16], are most usually (if not exclusively) tagged as *fulūl*.

Within the extended REVOLUTION frame, FULŪL corresponds to the slot described as Current_leadership of the Framenet's Revolution frame[17], but also to Side_2 slot of the Hostile_encounter frame. FULŪL appears as an embattled Enemy of the *revolutionary forces*, cf.:

> wa aḍāfa muʾnis fī risāla muṣawwara buttat al-layla anna *al-maʿraka badat wāḍiḥa* ḫilāl al-asābīʿ al-māḍiya bayna qiwā aṯ-ṯawra wa fulūl niẓām mubārak allaḏī yasʿī li-stirdād nufūḏihi wa anna *al-maʿraka* lā taqtaṣar ʿalā kawnihā *maʿraka intiḫābiya* bal hiya *maʿrakat ṯawra*[18]
>
> And Munis has added in a video message broadcast tonight that *the battle has become clear* (i.e. it has become clear that it is indeed a battle) over the past weeks between the revolutionary forces and FULŪL of the Mubarak regime, which seeks to recover its influence, and that the *battle* is not limited to its being an electoral *battle*, but it is a *battle for revolution* (lit. battle of revolution).

While the meaning of FULŪL seems to be self-evident for the speaker, defining the other side of the confrontation, the *we*-group, on the behalf of which the speaker is branding his or her opponents as FULŪL, may often present difficulties. Contribution of specific social and political groups to the Egyptian revolution of January 25, even more so the notion that the events of June 30, 2013, which led to the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated President Mursi, constituted another revolution or a completion/correction of the revolutionary cause, all these highly contested ideas may result in a serious disagreement about the status of a specific speaker as member of the group that could be identified as *ṯuwār* (revolutionaries). All speakers would, nevertheless, agree that FULŪL exist and represent a more or less clearly definable group. To identify the counterpart of FULŪL, the *we*-group that in most cases is not clearly named in the text, we have, therefore, resorted to using our own term *good guys* and occasionally simply *us*, marked in italics.

2. FULŪL as wrongdoers

When referring to the pre-revolutionary past, the Egyptian revolutionary discourse portrays FULŪL as systematically engaged in wrongdoings, cf.:

> al-fulūl hum man *istaʿādū wa tarabbaḥū* wa *kasabū min ḥarām amwāl* hāḏā aš-šaʿb al-miskīn, al-fulūl hum man saḥaw min nawmihim wa-ktašafū anna dawlat aẓ-ẓulm qad saqaṭat ilā ġayr rujʿa wa kānū yataʿayyašūna ʿalā aẓ-ẓulm[19]
> FULŪL are [those] who have sought returns and made profit and gained and robbed the forbidden property of this poor people, FULŪL are [those] who woke up from their sleep to find that the state of injustice had fallen with no [hope of] return, while they had been feeding on injustice…

This description includes almost all the key words used for decades in the criticism of the Ancien Régime by all colors of the Egyptian political opposition. Aside from key words, the paragraph also cites the most basic underlying relational frame, still widely used to explain local politics, i.e. *poor people* vs. the *unjust ruler*. While NIẒĀM (regime), with which FULŪL were associated, has disappeared and is now often described as *bāʾid* (the one that vanished, perished), essential qualities attributed to it have persisted in the form of core meaning components of the newly coined concept. They have been projected on or transferred to FULŪL together with the implied binary opposition as described above, albeit the modality of the binary relationship and the perceived relative strength of its two constituents have changed.

In the aftermath of the January 25, 2011 revolution, FULŪL are ascribed a tendency to 'return' or regain 'centrality' (*ṣadāra*) on the [political] scene, which is seen as major threat to the REVOLUTION. Cf. *aḫšā min ʿawdatihim ilā ṣadārat al-mašhad natījat ḍuʿf tanẓīm al-qiwā aṯ-ṯawriya* (I fear their return to the centrality of the scene)[20]. This is a clear case of orientational metaphor[21] that could be specified as CENTER is POWER. The presupposition of such statements is that presently FULŪL are seen as *peripheral* and hence *weak*. Return to centrality is seen as FULŪL's essential tendency, a goal they strive to achieve through a set of specific actions. They are seen as engaged in *buying votes* (*širāʾ al-aṣwāt*), *deception* and *attempting* to *re-write the history* of January 25 revolution (*yuġāliṭūna wa yuḥāwilūna iʿādat kitābat tārīḫ ṯawrat yanāʾīr*)[22], *assembling their supporters* and *dragging the masses to go out against authorities* (*ḥašd anṣārihim wa jarr al-jamāhīr ilā al-ḫurūj ʿalā an-niẓām*)[23], *violent acts* against revolutionaries (*qāma al- fulūl bi-ḍarb an-nāʾib as-sābiq ʿan ḥizb al-hurriya wa al-ʿadāla… wa kāda al-fulūl an yaftakū bihi* – FULŪL have beaten a former deputy from Freedom and Justice Party (…) almost came down on him[24]), *insulting the president and revolution* (*isāʾa li-r-raʾīs wa aṯ-ṯawra*)[25], *penetrating the political life* (*tawaġġul fī al-ḥayā as-siyāsiya*)[26], and

corrupting or *spoiling the political work* (*ifsād al-'amal as-siyāsī*). Such wrongdoings are often cited as reasons that justify specific acts of persecution against FULŪL by *good guys*, cf.:

> ahālī al-iskandariya yuṭāridūna al-fulūl li-isā'atihim li-r-ra'īs wa aṯ-ṯawra
> Locals of Alexandria are chasing FULŪL for their insulting of the president and revolution.

The texts that do not explicitly refer to any such counter-FULŪL activities are still designed to leave the reader with an impression that 'something needs to be done'.

FULŪL are also attributed symbolic acts of derogatory nature, meaning to humiliate them, which may be expressed by idioms, cf.:

> iḍrab bi-quwwa yā mursī fa-l-fulūl yataqayya'ūna dam li-nijāḥātika ad-duwaliya wa irjā' amwāl al-arāḍī[27]
> Beat strongly, Mursi, for FULŪL are *vomiting blood* because of your international successes and the return of land money.

The paragraph conveys the message of encouragement to President Mursi by referring to demoralizing effect of his success upon his political opponents. Pragmatically, as we see from the above examples various acts are attributed to FULŪL not for the sake of providing an accurate description of their activities, but rather to stimulate or justify certain proactive moves on the part of the other party – the *good guys*, described as 'Egyptian people', concerned 'locals', the 'revolutionary' president, Army etc.

'Taking the central position on the scene' appears to be the key, if not the only, euphemism of power that could be attributed to FULŪL. In the paragraph below, it appears that FULŪL although having acquired some sort of 'centrality' (i.e. POWER) have done so somehow very locally, and the author seems to be referring to this fact in a manner of warning rather than asserting that FULŪL have finally fulfilled their goal:

> tatawāṣal al-intihākāt al-ḫāṣṣa bi-l-istiftā' bi-muḥāfaẓat kafr aš-šayḫ min ḫilāl *taṣaddur fulūl al-ḥizb al-waṭanī al-munḥall li-l-mašhad* wa da'wa li-n-nās li-t-taṣwīt bi-na'am 'alā ad-dastūr wa ḥašd an-nāḫibīn li-t-taṣwīt bi-na'am bi-stiḫdām šattā al-wasā'l al-mumkina fa-qad qām al-fulūl wa mu'ayyidī al-inqilāb bi-istiḫdām mukabbirāt al-masājid fī ad-da'wa li-n-nuzūl wa at-taṣwīt bi-na'am 'alā ad-dastūr kamā ḥadaṯa fī qaryat al-kūm al-aḥmar bi-balṭīm[28]…
> There continue violations related to the referendum in the governorate of Kafr el-Shaikh through the *occupation of the central position* (taṣaddur) *on the scene* on the part of FULŪL of the dissolved National [Democratic] Party and the call of the people to vote 'yes' on the Constitution and assembling the voters for voting 'yes' by deploying all possible methods, and FULŪL and the supporters of the coup have used loudspeakers of the mosques for calling for coming out and voting 'yes' on the Constitution as happened in the village of Kum al-Ahmar in Baltem…

The manner in which FULŪL intend to achieve their purposes is, however, indirect. Cf.:

> wa ayyan kān naw' min al-matā'ib fa-sa-tajid al-kaṯīr min an-nās yakšif 'an wujūd 'umalā' qāma al-fulūl bi-taḥrīḍihim li-yuṯbitū anna miṣr bidūna mubārak tusāwī al-fawḍa[29]
> And whatever the type of troubles, you will find a lot of people who expose agents, [who] FULŪL have incited in order to prove that Egypt without Mubarak equates disorder.

They are not seen as going headlong to their aspired ultimate goal of regaining power, but do it by trying to weaken their opponents. The subversive actions as listed above are meant to contribute to the creation of a state of disorder in the society described as FITNA (an intraethnic or intraconfessional strife) or FAWḌA (anarchy, disorder), sometimes specified more technically as *ḥarb ahliya* (civil war). This list of nominations refers

to the same social reality of a profound disaster with FITNA as a native and also a Sharia term appearing as the most self-evident and capturing the very essence of threat posed by FULŪL.

3. It's either us or them: the force dynamics aspects

Importantly, semantics of FULŪL and their opponents, the *good guys*, who may be described as *revolutionaries* or simply *us*[30], are paired, particularly, in the evaluative component. The mechanism of this pairing is based on an asymmetry of qualities. Any statement regarding relative *power* of FULŪL will imply *weakness* of *us*, the *good guys*. Same asymmetry is observed in the implied moral evaluation of physical acts ascribed to both parties. For instance, FULŪL could be attributed openly aggressive behaviors, which they may espouse in response to what is presented as a justified rejection of them on the part of the people, cf.:

> amām rafḍ al-ahālī wujūd al-fulūl amām al-minṭaqa aš-šimāliya qām al-fulūl bi-rašq al-ahālī bi-l-ḥijāra wa az-zujājāt al-fāriġa wa al-mulutuf wa al-asliḥa an-nāriya wa al-bayḍā' mimmā iḍṭarra al-ʿadīd min aṣḥāb al-maḥāll at-tijāriya bi-šāriʿ būr saʿīd ilā iġlāq maḥāllihim taḫawwufan min ḥudūṯ ayy iʿtidā' ʿalayhim[31]
>
> In the face of the rejection of the presence of FULŪL in front of the Northern District, FULŪL have showered the [local] residents with stones, empty bottles, Molotov [cocktails], fire and cold arms, which forced many owners of trading outlets on Port Said Street to close their shops in fear of an assault against them.

Obviously, the local residents must have tried to force FULŪL out of their district, which could have provoked a violent reaction on the part of the latter. The text, however, does not explicitly attribute any such violent acts to the party that enjoys empathy of the author, substituting those with a vague moral concept of *rejection*, which is presupposed to be self-evident and self-justified.

When it comes to FULŪL engagement in acts that could potentially be a game changer with regard to power balance, if even at a local level, these are often presented as *attempts*. Cf.:

> fī madīnat balqās ijtamaʿa 30 min fulūl al-ḥizb al-waṭanī bi-muḥāfaẓat ad-daqahliya muʿẓamuhum min aʿḍā' majlis aš-šaʿb as-sābiq *fī muḥāwala minhum lamm aš-šaml* baʿd mā aṣāba al-ḥizb min inhiyār wa ḍiyāʿbaʿd ṯawrat 25 yanāyīr allatī aṭāḥat bi-n-niẓām al-bāʾid al-fāsid allaḏī haymana ʿalā al-ḥayā as-siyāsiya akṯar min rubʿ qarn[32]
>
> In the city of Belqas, 30 FULŪL of the National [Democratic] Party in the Daqahlia governorate have gathered, most of them members of the former people's council, in *an attempt on their part to re-unite* after collapse and loss that had afflicted the Party in the aftermath of the January 25 revolution, which had brought down the defunct corrupt regime that dominated political life for more than quarter century.

The Arabic verb *ḥāwal* just as its English match *try* 'involves focus at the initial phase without knowledge of its outcome'[33]. The act, in which FULŪL features as Agent, *ijtamaʿa* (gathered) is, hence, presented as an initial phase of the act of *lamm aš-šaml* (reunion). The latter idiomatic expression is composed of *lamm* (gather, unite) and *šaml* (entirety, integrity, integral whole), which in this context implies that FULŪL were trying to bring all their forces together again. The paragraph, however, implies that for some reasons this purpose has not been fully achieved.

Here is one more example:

> wa aḍāfa al-ʿādlī annahu yatawaqqaʿ qiyām ṯawra šaʿbiya lā taqill ʿan ṯawrat yūnyū iḏā mā *ḥāwala* fulūl al-waṭanī al-munḥall aw baqāyā jamāʿat al-iḫwān al-muslimīn al-maḥẓūra *al-wusūl ilā majlis aš-ša'b*[34]

> And el-Adli[35] added that [he] is expecting the rise of popular revolution no less [strong] than June Revolution if FULŪL of the dissolved National [Democratic] Party or the leftovers of the prohibited Society of the Muslim Brothers *would try to enter the People's Assembly…*

Here the act, where FULŪL features as the Agent, is part of a conditional clause, which implies that the act has not actually occurred, but has a degree of probability, FULŪL are ascribed a tendency to perform the act and may engage on its initial phase (*try* to enter the Parliament), but will hardly succeed as they stand to face resistance on the part of a stronger counter-force (the rise of the popular revolution).

In the example below the REVOLUTION is represented as an ongoing purposeful movement, while FULŪL are portrayed as those who are *trying to impede* it:

> al-fulūl tuṭlaq ‘alā man *yuḥāwil i‘āqat* aṯ-ṯawra ‘an taḥqīq ahdāfihā li-l-qaḍā’ ‘alā aẓ-ẓulm wa aṭ-ṭuġyān. al-fulūl hum man yarfaḍūna ši‘ārāt aṯ-ṯawra allatī rafaḍat (sic., probably, the author meant to say *rufi‘at*) wa tuṭālib bi-l-ḥurriya wa al-karāma wa al-‘adāla al-ijtimā‘iya[36] [the term] FULŪL applies to whoever is *trying to obstruct* the revolution from the fulfillment of its goals of eliminating injustice and tyranny. FULŪL are [those] who reject the slogans of the revolution that were raised and demand freedom, dignity and social justice.

The three above examples reflect a force-dynamic pattern, where FULŪL is a relatively weak Antagonist, and REVOLUTION (or any sentient entity representing it, such as REVOLUTIONARIES, PEOPLE's WILL or simply *us*) is an Agonist[37]. All the above reviewed acts that FULŪL perform on the public scene (buying votes, forging elections, trying to penetrate public offices, instigating public disorder etc.) also fall into the same pattern as they affectively substantiate their presumed natural tendency to *obstruct* the REVOLUTION.

To complete our brief analysis of the phase aspects of acts ascribed to FULŪL we will now review examples containing another phase verb *najaḥ* (succeed) – a pair to *ḥāwal* (try). While the verb *ḥāwal* (try) 'involves focus at the initial phase without knowledge of its outcome', the verb *najaḥ* (succeed) shifts the focus 'on a known occurrent or non-occurrent outcome'[38]. Examples containing the collocations of FULŪL and *najaḥ* in their various forms – *najaḥ* (perf.), *yanjaḥ* (imperf.), *al-fulūl* (def.), *fulūl + genitive attribute* (e.g. *fulūl an-niẓām as-sābiq* – FULŪL of former regime) – feature persistent pragmatic patterns of *threat* or *warning*. Syntactic patterns include emphatic *negation* (*lan yanjaḥ al-fulūl* – FULŪL will never succeed), *negative part. lam + imperfect* (*lam yanjaḥ al-fulūl* – FULŪL have not succeeded), *question* (*hal yanjaḥ al-fulūl* – will FULŪL succeed?). Success of FULŪL is also often described as a *hypothetical situation*, syntactically expressed either as unreal conditional clause (*law najaḥ fulūl* – were FULŪL to succeed) or, which seems to be less frequent, a simple conditional clause (*iḏā najaḥ fulūl* – if FULŪL succeeded). Cf.:

> a) lan yanjaḥ fulūl an-niẓām al-bāid fī ayy šay wa ‘alayhim an yanḥāzū ilā al-ḥaqq wa yaltaffū ḥawla aṯ-ṯawra wa yatūbū ‘ammā iqtarafat aydīhim[39]
> FULŪL of the defunct regime will never succeed in anything and they have to align with truth and rally around the revolution and repent for what their hands have committed
> b) hal yanjaḥ fulūl al-munḥall fī iṯārat al-fitan wa al-azamāt li-iḥrāj ar-ra’īs?[40]
> Will FULŪL of the dissolved [National Democratic Party] succeed in exciting FITAN (pl. of FITNA – intraethnic strives) and crises [in order] to discomfit the president?
> c) wa law najaḥa al-fulūl la-‘āda aš-šarr wa ‘āda al-fasād li-yulqī bi-misra fī ṣirā‘āt wa mahālik lā ya‘limuhā illā aḷḷāh[41]

And if FULŪL were to succeed, the evil would come back and corruption would come back [in order] to throw Egypt into conflicts and perils that only Allah knows.

We have, however, encountered utterances, where collocations of FULŪL & derivatives of *najaḥ* (succeed) could be interpreted as indicating successful completion of various acts by FULŪL. As these cases appear to be quite few, and contradicting the previously

reviewed abundant material that tends to ascribe to FULŪL mainly incomplete acts or those of limited affect, they merit a closer look. Here are two typical contexts:

> d) wa qāla muḥammad as-sattār amīn ʿām an-niqāba al-ʿāmma al-mustaqilla li-l-ʿāmilīn bi-hayʾat an-naql al-ʿām: ʿinqasamat al-garājāt ʿalā qirār faḍḍ al-iḍrāb wa ḏālika baʿd an najaḥ fulūl an-niẓām as-sābiq min ḫilāl al-asālib al-multawiya fī at-taʾṯīr ʿalā baʿḍ ʿummāl al-hayʾa allaḏīna qarrarū taʿlīq al-iḍrāb[42]
>
> And Muhammad as-Sattar, Secretary General of the independent General Trade Union of the workers of the Department of General Transport, said: 'the garages have divided over the decision to call off the strike, which [happened] after FULŪL of the former regime have succeeded by way of devious methods in influencing some workers of the Department who decided to suspend the strike.
>
> e) iḏan fa-qad *najaḥ al-fulūl fī-ṣṭyād aṯ-ṯawra* wa *tarwīḍ al-kutla aṯ-ṯawriya* min ḥayṯ arādat hāḏihi al-kutla instiʾnās al-fulūl wa damjahum fīhā wa an-natīja: ġāba aṯ-ṯuwār wa ḥaḍar al-fulūl… ṣaʿadat aṯ-ṯawra al-muḍādda wa habaṭat aṯ-ṯawra al-ḥaqīqiya ilā ad-darak allaḏī alqat fīhi ṣuwar aš-šuhadāʾ ʿalā al-arḍ wa rafaʿat ṣuwaran li-šuhadāʾ muzayyafīn wa majja-dat allaḏīna ahdarū ḥuqūqahum bi-l-laʿb fī al-awrāq wa al-adilla wa ṣanaʿat minhum rumūzan li-l-istiqlāl wa an-nidāl[43]
>
> So FULŪL have succeeded in hunting [down] the revolution and taming the revolutionary block as this block wished to domesticate FULŪL and integrate them with itself, the result [was that] the revolutionaries have disappeared and FULŪL appeared [instead]… the counter-revolution has risen and the true revolution has subsided to the extent that it threw down images (lit. pictures) of martyrs on the ground and raised images of fake martyrs and glorified those [who] have wasted their rights by playing with cards and evidence and made out of them symbols of independence and struggle.

In both (d) and (e) FULŪL are ascribed acts from the familiar list of *wrongdoings* (deception). Paragraph (d) refers to a situation where FULŪL have achieved some low level success – a merely tactical one in fact. Paragraph (e) represents quite an opposite situation, where FULŪL have produced a complete disaster, have almost defeated the 'true revolution'[44]. These two contexts are very typical: it is either a low scale tactical victory or a political apocalypse with hardly any middle ground in between. In the arsenal of *successfully* accomplished acts ascribed to FULŪL, we have not been able to locate any medium level, 'ordinary', acts or events that characterize normal everyday human experience.

Seemingly defeatist messages such as (e) can usually be traced back to peaks of political crises in Egypt. Their illocutionary point is to rally support for the 'true revolutionaries' in the face of an imminent threat that they describe. Paragraph (e) claims that FULŪL have afflicted major losses on the revolutionaries, which, notably, appear to be mainly of moral and symbolic nature (*martyrs* have been humiliated by their *images being thrown down on the ground*). The Hunting metaphor portrays REVOLUTION as a *prey* and FULŪL as a *beast of prey* or a human *hunter*. Such account of FULŪL's acts as provided in (e), or even more so in (c), is far removed from the language of everyday human activity, it is almost an epic, considering, particularly, the reference to the superhuman forces – the eternal Evil and God's wisdom.

4. Who is behind it? Conspiracy theories and the moral judgment

While FULŪL mostly do not appear as an active Agent, one specific construction featuring FULŪL in association with events and actions merits a special analysis. The illocutionary point of utterances based on this construction in most cases is to *accuse* FULŪL of being somehow instrumental in causing a certain event, while still, as we shall see downplaying their active role in it. The construction may be schematically represented as X is *warāʾ* (behind) E, where X stands for a sentient entity responsible for E, an event of mostly negative nature, cf.:

a) *al-fulūl warā' tarākum mašākil al-ḥayy* – FULŪL [are] behind the accumulation of the neighborhood's problems[45];

b) *al-fulūl warā' aḥdāṯ masbīrū* – FULŪL [are] behind the events of Maspero[46];

c) *al-fulūl warā' ḥarq al-mujamma' al-'ilmī* – FULŪL [are] behind the burning of the scientific complex[47];

d) *al-fulūl warā' aḥdāṯ al-'abbasiya li-ta'jīl al-intiḫābāt ar-ri'āsiya* – FULŪL [are] behind the events of al-Abbasiya (official spelling el-Abaseya) [in order] to delay the presidential elections[48];

e) *al-fulūl warā' 'uzūf aš-šabāb 'an il-mušāraka fī-l-intiḫābāt* – FULŪL [are] behind the reluctance of the youth to participate in the elections[49];

f) *al-fulūl warā' rafḍ al-badawī al-inḍimām li-taḥāluf mūsā* – FULŪL [are] behind the refusal of el-Badawi to join [Amr] Musa's Alliance[50];

h) *al-fulūl warā' insiḫābī min ijtimā' as-silmī* – FULŪL [are] behind my withdrawal from the meeting [organized by] Silmi[51];

g) *fulūl warā' fitnat al-islāmiyīna wa al-libraliyīn* – FULŪL [are] behind the FITNA (a Sharia concept describing a conflict within the Muslim community) of Islamists and Liberals[52].

While the use of *warā'* in a causative sense is not limited to the description of events with negative evaluation, the elliptic phrases such as the above ones clearly sound accusatory. The construction implies a type of causative relationship between X and E, while rendering this relationship totally opaque as regards to the manner in which such causation could have occurred. Phrase (c) contains a substantivated form (*maṣdar*) of a transitive verb *ḥaraqa* (burn), which implies an Agent, but the *warā'* construction instead of saying that FULŪL have *actually burned the place* transforms their role to that of Cause of the event of *burning*, which may not necessarily be a direct one. But the segment certainly presents FULŪL as an entity that has provided the necessary conditions for the negative event to happen, and should, therefore, take the blame. Case (b) demonstrates an even weaker implication of Agency, while (a) simply excludes it: the FULŪL could hardly be seen as consciously *accumulating* problems, rather they have probably *let* them accumulate. Case (d) appears to be somewhat peculiar: it features a Purpose of the event. It all but reconstitutes the Agency back from implicature, as the phrase could easily be reformulated as *FULŪL have organized the events of al-Abaseya [in order] to delay the presidential elections*[53]. Case (g) appears to imply an agency only in translation, indeed *Conflict* must have at least two sides involved in it, but the Islamic concept of FITNA describes social conflict in a manner that does not foreground any 'us' vs. 'them', but rather a split 'us', which refers to the entire community, that experiences a state of division. Cases (e, f, h) feature an explicitly expressed Agent, but completely distinct from FULŪL. Let us review the text that follows phrase (h) in order to establish the type of relationship binding FULŪL and the Agent of the act featuring in the segment (*withdrawal*) together:

barrara al-muhandis abū al-'alā māḍī ra'īs ḥizb al-wasaṭ sabab insiḫābihi min al-ijtimā' allaḏī da'ā ilayhi d. 'alī as-silmī nā'ib ra'īs al-wuzarā' li-š-šu'ūn as-siyāsiya wa at-taḥawwul ad-dīmuqrāṭī bi-anna ḏālika jā'a iḥtijājan 'alā wujūd al-'adīd min fulūl al-ḥizb al-waṭanī as-sābiq wa kaḏālika wujūd al-kaṯīr min al-aḥzāb al-kartūniya allatī ṣuni'at 'alā aydī an-niẓām as-sābiq[54]

The Engineer Abu-l-Ala Madi, chairman of the Wasat Party, justified the reason for his withdrawal from the meeting that Dr. Ali as-Silmi, Deputy Prime Minister for political affairs and democratic transition, called for, by that it occurred in protest to the presence of a number of FULŪL of the former National Democratic Party and also the presence of puppet (lit. cardboard) parties created by the former regime.

The paragraph reveals a sociosemiotic pattern proscribing someone, who is not FULŪL, from attending an event where FULŪL are present to avoid being associated with them. FULŪL have thus affected a certain symbolic act on the part of the Agent

(declining to attend a meeting in protest) without taking any action at all, merely by providing grounds for a certain reading of a social setting.

The key concept that the *warā'* construction evokes is Responsibility. The Framenet[55] provides the following definition of the Responsibility frame: '[a]n Agent is responsible for having intentionally performed an Act or for being a primary instigator behind the Act'. The material that we have reviewed in this section falls rather under the second part of this definition as it mostly excludes or obscures any direct engagement of FULŪL in the Act. English illustrative material on the Framenet for the lexical unit *behind*, on the contrary, mainly refers to 'intentionally performed acts' such as 'attacks', 'bombing', and 'killing', evoking frames[56] with clearly definable agents and patients in contrast to events like 'reluctance to participate in elections', 'withdrawal from a meeting', 'accumulation of problems', or FITNA (intragroup strife).

5. Conclusions

Acts ascribed to FULŪL represent a narrow set of politically subversive, unjust, immoral and illegal activities that we have tentatively summarized as *wrongdoings*. Even the mere presence of FULŪL on the scene of whatever scale may cause a negative outcome. FULŪL's acts represent a manifestation of their natural tendency to obstruct the REVOLUTION, while the latter is conceptualized as a positive purposeful movement of people toward a better future. Actions of FULŪL are directional – they are opposite to those of the REVOLUTION and directed toward occupying the *central part* of the *scene*, metaphorically associated with POWER. In discussing real life events associated with FULŪL the discourse of the Egyptian revolution gives preference to lexical items and constructions that either preclude FULŪL from assuming the sematic role of an Agent or limit FULŪL's role of an Agent to the initial phase of the acts[57], or an initial act in a presupposed series.

Acts of FULŪL are part of a larger frame of REVOLUTION and their relative strength and effectiveness cannot be independently assessed outside of a single force-dynamics pattern embedded in this larger frame. If a particular speaker sees the REVOLUTION as making progress, which is the main tendency in the revolutionary discourse, FULŪL will be presented as *trying* to perform *wrongdoings*, or even accomplishing single acts in a presumed series ultimately intended to bring FULŪL to the aspired central position and prevent the REVOLUTION from going forward, but never actually reaching these goals. Yet if things go wrong to whatever extent, it is FULŪL who will be held responsible as someone who was *behind* such a negative outcome. On the contrary, should the speaker for whatever reason, including a merely rhetorical one, hypothesize the *defeat* of the Revolution, or assert that it is already actually happening, the FULŪL will be ascribed accomplished socially harmful acts of larger, almost, an epic scale, albeit fundamentally very similar in their nature – it will be basically the same type of *wrongdoings* that they have been engaged in so far anyway.

At the face of it, the ideas that FULŪL are (a) almost denied the capacity to act or at least act effectively and that (b) they still represent a threat – may appear logically inconsistent, but they are not incoherent[58]. Both fit into the idea that FULŪL should not be occupying the *central position* or rather should not *be present on the scene at all*. They only are safe when they are out, their mere presence may trigger off a negative course of events, anyone who shares the space with them is either in danger of morally compromised. The denial of agency to FULŪL represents an act of their symbolic removal from *central* position associated with POWER through the CENTER is POWER orientational metaphor.

One way of downplaying an active role of FULŪL is by expressing the relationship between FULŪL and the events at the focus of discussion with the help of non-core elements of the respective semantic frames, substituting the semantic role of Agent by a more general one of Cause, which downplays or hides a potentially more active engagement of

FULŪL in producing the event in question. It the paired relationship between FULŪL and *us*, the *good guys* that appears to motivate such preferences: to assign an active role to FULŪL would imply presenting the revolutionaries as a weaker party. Such discursive strategies may, hence, be seen as a verbal expression of otherwise material political struggle.

As a grammatical construction foregrounding the Cause, while precluding explicit representation of the type of agency involved, *X behind E* is not merely an economical grammatical device. Neither is it uniquely Arabic, as parallel constructions exist in other languages, including English[59]. In both cases, such constructions represent a convenient way of expressing specific ideological beliefs. The implied question 'who stands behind it?', to which this construction answers, appears to be a universal mantra of conspiracy theorists. To *be behind* something implies being removed from the field of vision, while being still present on the scene. *X* effectively may represent an invisible malevolent force, the ultimate cause of every disaster, whose identity the idiom claims to reveal. From the conspiracy theory perspective, it is not relevant to know exactly *how* a particular event could have come to pass. Moreover, the assumption that details regarding *how* the Agent of a conspiracy is manipulating other parties may *never* be known is an essential part of this worldview. It is, therefore, sufficient to reveal the name of the wrongdoer, whose interests the negative event in question supposedly serves and who, therefore, stands to be accused.

There are several reasons, why a new nomination *fulūl* had to come to the fore and reshaped the archetypical ideas of ENEMY/OPPONENT and (political and social) OTHER in the context of the Egyptian Arab Spring. Unlike generic nominations such as *enemy*, *fulūl* is an asymmetrical term that projects an unequal relationship of power and moral superiority, while, if A and B are described as *enemies*, both A and B may call each other an *enemy* on equal terms. It is also linked to a certain scenario frame describing the *enemy* as the one that has been of should be *defeated*. We will discuss pragmatic aspects of the concept of FULŪL in some more detail in the next article of this series[60].

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[1] This is the 2nd article in a series on the construction of social and political *other* in the discourse of the Arab Spring in Egypt; the two others include: *A. Bogomolov. Got a problem – destroy it! A frame-semantic analysis of the proverb* lā yafullu al-ḥadīd illā al-ḥadīd *in the Egyptian revolutionary discourse*. The World of the Orient (Skhidnyi Svit), 2014, № 2, pp. 101–110 and *A. Bogomolov.* FULŪL *and* REVOLUTIONARIES: *Negotiating social boundaries in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring*, Skhodoznavstvo, 2014, № 65–66, pp. 15–31.

[2] On the significance of this revolutionary slogan and its derivative concept IRĀDA(t) AŠ-ŠAʻB see ours Kontsept IRĀDA(t) AŠ-ŠAʻB (volya naroda) v diskurse 'arabskoi vesny'. Skhodoznavstvo, 2013, № 64, pp. 15–27.

[3] No such descriptive extension could probably have been attached to what for most Egyptians had just recently served as the prototype of the REVOLUTION – the Nasserite July 23, 1952; while the latter would be habitually described as *glorious* (al-magīda), the recent one probably needed an epithet explicating the *meaning* of the event as opposed to its status, outlook or externally appreciated value.

[4] Cf. George Lakoff, Mark Johnson. Metaphors we live by. London: The university of Chicago press. 2003.

[5] FrameNet is a web-based corpus that contains description of the internal structure of various semantic frames that refer to situations, actions, events such as Revolution, Hostile encounter, Fight etc. – cf. https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/home

[6] Cf. Leonard Talmy, Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition, Cognitive Science, 12, 49–100 (1968).

[7] With very few exceptions google search for the word *fulūl* in Arabic will return an enormous amount of texts related to the recent Egyptian revolution(s) or Arab Spring countries; we see it as a compelling evidence of both the salience and the newness of the concept.

[8] Cf. Revolution on Frame Index at https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/index.php?q=frameIndex.

[9] Cf. Hostile_encounter on the Frame Index – ibid.

[10] For instance, some texts argue or even presuppose that Muslim Brotherhood is a major revolutionary force, while others claim that they are an element of the pre-January 25 Ancien Régime; the military may feature as protectors of the revolution or the main counter-revolutionary force, part of the Ancien Régime, that struggles for the restoration of the old ways, which will affect the manner, in which these text use the basic concepts such as FULŪL.

[11] Arabic-English Lexicon by Edward William Lane (London: Willams & Norgate, 1863).

[12] Cf. A. Bogomolov. Got a problem – destroy it! A frame-semantic analysis of the proverb *lā yafullu al-ḥadīd illā al-ḥadīd* in the Egyptian revolutionary discourse. The World of the Orient, 2014, № 2, pp. 101–110.

[13] From an anonymous war memoir published on the web on 7 October 2009. – http://www.hmselklob.com/vb/archive/index.php?/t-9289.html

[14] Cf. *wa al-fallu: al-munhazimūna. wa falla al-qawma yafulluhum fallan: hazamahum fa-infallū. wa hum qawmun fallun: muhazimūna, wa al-jamʿu fulūlun … wa al-fallu: al-qawmu al-munhazimūna wa aṣluhu min al-kasr, wa infalla sinnuhu (…) al-fallu aṭ-ṭalmy fī as-sayf* – Ibn Manẓūr, Muḥammad b. Mukarram b. ʿAlī b. Aḥmad al-Anṣārī al-Ifrīqī al-Miṣrī Jamāl al-Dīn Abū l-Faḍl. Lisān al-ʿarab. Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1955–1956, 15 vols.

[15] In the same manner as the word ʿ*arabī* means both 'an Arab' and 'Arabic'; by contrast classical Arabic dictionaries describe *fulūl* as the plural form of *fall* (a notch), which is out of use in modern language (cf. Arabic-English Lexicon by Edward William Lane. London: Willams & Norgate 1863), attesting to the opaqueness of the grammatical structure of *fulūl* for the modern speakers of Arabic.

[16] See *A. Bogomolov.* FULŪL *and* REVOLUTIONARIES: *Negotiating social boundaries in the discourse of the Egyptian Arab Spring*, Skhodoznavstvo, 2014, № 65–66, pp. 15–31.

[17] The term 'current', however, appears to be not quite appropriate as FULŪL rather refers to elements of what used 'current leadership'.

[18] The text is part of news article dated 14 April 2014, the time when the candidate nomination for extraordinary presidential elections of 26-28 May 2014. – http://goo.gl/s8PTIs

[19] http://www.masress.com/almessa/29168

[20] http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/233400.aspx

[21] Cf. George Lakoff, Mark Johnson. Metaphors we live by. London: The University of Chicago press, 2003, p. 15.

[22] http://www.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/233400.aspx

[23] http://www.masress.com/almashhad/22247

[24] http://www.vetogate.com/169654 Freedom and Justice Party is a political wing of Muslim Brotherhood.

[25] http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/v3/Article.aspx?ArtID=117949&SecID=470

[26] http://ikhwanonline.net/new/print.aspx?ArtID=95570&SecID=0

[27] It is a news article title dated 23 Nov., 2012 – i.e. the hey day of Mohammad Mursi's presidency: http://www.masrawy.com/ketabat/ArticlesDetails.aspx?AID=190146

[28] The paragraph contains a list of a few more villages which we have omitted for sake of space. – http://www.shbabalnil.com/?p=38588

[29] http://www.horytna.net/Articles/Printdetails.aspx?AID=79647&ZID=

[30] Texts foregrounding FULŪL quite often have no explicit reference to the other party, its presence is however an essential part of the presupposed background.

[31] http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/v3/Article.aspx?ArtID=117949&SecID=470

[32] http://www.masress.com/alzaman/1492

[33] Cf. Talmy's description of the semantics of the verb 'try' in Leonard Talmy, Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition, Cognitive Science, 12, 49–100 (1968), p. 74.

[34] http://www.el-balad.com/638921

[35] Sayyid el-Adli, Egyptian journalist, founder of the Egyptian Independence Party.

[36] http://www.masress.com/almessa/29168

[37] On the semantic roles of Agonist and Antagonist and the notions of their relative *strength* and the *resultant* produced by their force-dynamic interaction cf. Leonard Talmy, Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition, Cognitive Science, 12, 49–100 (1968), pp. 53–54.

[38] Cf. Leonard Talmy. Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition. Cognitive Science, 12, 49–100 (1968), p. 74.

[39] http://goo.gl/434KlL

[40] http://www.rassd.com/7-21602.htm

[41] http://goo.gl/UkHsu3

[42] http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/114167

[43] http://goo.gl/M0owhH

[44] The article, from which the cited paragraph was borrowed, carries a characteristic title 'Taṯwīr al-fulūl am taflīl aṯ-ṯawra (turning FULŪL into revolutionaries or FULŪL-izing the revolution), and is dated 17 April 2013, the time of deepening political crisis, when a mass protest movement broke out against Muslim Brotherhood affiliated president Muhammad Mursi, who was then overthrown by the military in less then three months.

[45] http://new.elfagr.org/Detail.aspx?secid=0&vid=0&nwsId=234446

[46] http://www.masress.com/shabab/7193

[47] http://goo.gl/ox0leU

[48] http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=669295#.U8pttpSSy6I

[49] http://www.vetogate.com/1037408

[50] http://goo.gl/Rw71PH

[51] http://goo.gl/M3y83H

[52] http://www.dostor.org/164785

[53] Case (d) is a news article title and it does not appear to us as a normally constructed phrase, rather it is a shorthand summary of the article that follows enumerating a long series of various negative public events, which, according to the author, all represent evidence of FULŪL's *intention to delay the elections* (niyatuhum fī ta'jīl al-intiḫābāt).

[54] http://goo.gl/M3y83H

[55] Cf. https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/index.php?q=frameIndex

[56] For the notion of 'evoking' frames cf. Jozsef Andor. Discussing the frame semantics: The state of the art. An interview with Charles J. Fillmore. Review of Cognitive Semantics, 8:1, 2010, p. 158.

[57] As in the case of *ḥāwal al-fulūl an…* (FULŪL tried to), which 'involves focus at the initial phase without knowledge of its outcome' – cf. Talmy's description of the semantics of the verb 'try' in Leonard Talmy, Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition, Cognitive Science, 12, 49–100 (1968), p. 74.

[58] Cf. Lakoff's discussion of *consistency* vs. *coherence* in the case of the metaphorical representations of time in George Lakoff, Mark Johnson. Metaphors we live by. London: The University of Chicago press. 2003, pp. 44–45. According to Lakoff, although the two metaphors TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT and TIME IS STATIONARY AND WE MOVE THROUGH IT 'are not consistent (that is, they form no single image), they nonetheless "fit together," by virtue of being subcategories of a major category and therefore sharing a major common entailment', namely, that 'from our point of view, time goes past us from front to back'.

[59] The discussion of the source of this obvious parallelism, for instance, whether or not the Arabic construction is a syntactic calque from English, French or both, as colonial languages widely spoken in the Arab countries, does not seem to be particularly relevant for the purposes of this research.

[60] See A. Bogomolov. Got a problem – destroy it! A frame-semantic analysis of the proverb *lā yafullu al-ḥadīd illā al-ḥadīd* in the Egyptian revolutionary discourse. The World of the Orient, 2014, № 2, pp. 101–110.